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Executive summary
This report discusses the successor to Britain’s Trident nuclear
missile system. It examines British dependence on the United States
and concludes that most of the discussion on the replacement is
based on the false premise that the UK has an independent nuclear
weapon. To support this conclusion, the report reviews the history of
Britain’s involvement with nuclear weapons from 1940 to the present
day to show a sixty-year-old pattern of British dependence on the US
for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).
The report also concludes that Trident should not be replaced and
should be phased out now, as neither Trident nor any US-supported
successor would meet the ‘1940 requirement’ for a system that the
nation can rely on if it stands alone as in 1940. Back in the Second
World War, the British government concluded it could not be a
nuclear power without US support. Half a century later, the
dependence remains decisive: President George Bush Snr ordered
his officials to ‘produce additional nuclear weapons parts as
necessary for transfer to the United Kingdom’ (page 14). For fifty
years, successive governments have concluded that Britain cannot
afford an independent nuclear deterrent. An independent system is
not an option.
The nuclear relationship will continue ‘to tie the UK to US policy’
according to Admiral Raymond Lygo, former Chairman of British
Aerospace and director of strategic systems modernisation for the
Royal Navy (Page 26). Not replacing Trident is essential for Britain
to reclaim freedom of action for the twenty first century, for a Trident
replacement may be expected to last until 2060.
The UK should renew the multilateral disarmament agenda which
achieved so much in the 1980s and 1990s. It is unrealistic to
consider that the world can continue indefinitely with uncontrolled
nuclear armaments and not see a nuclear war.
The government should also address a number of technical
questions on Britain’s WMD and associated technologies:
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1. How can the WMD operated by Britain be used should the
United States withdraw its support or act preventively?
2. Were any reassurances required by the Bush Administration
before it renewed the US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement in
2004 concerning the direction of British defence and civil
nuclear policy?
3. How near to production is the US-assisted nuclear weapon
the Conservative government tested and developed after
Trident and cancelled in October 1993?
4. How much of the spending at Aldermaston is on equipment
and services from US companies?
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Introduction
The UK government has stated that, during the 2005-2010
Parliament, a decision will need to be made on a successor to what it
calls the UK’s Independent Nuclear Deterrent.1 The current system is
the American Trident submarine-launched ballistic missile fitted with
nuclear weapons, which is expected to be worn out by the late
2020s.
This study explains the key issues of the UK WMD programme in
their historical context. It details the UK’s unique dependence on the
US for supplying and using WMD, and its importance in modern
politics. As Chris Bellamy writes:
the British deterrent is probably the least independent of any…could this
be one reason why Prime Minister Tony Blair has been at such pains to
support US foreign and strategic policy over the past eight years?2
I also review the current debate in Britain over the Trident renewal.
The UN,3 governments and the media describe nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons and ballistic missiles4 as Weapons of Mass
Destruction. The term WMD will be used in this study to describe UK
operated nuclear weapons and the weapon systems that carry them.
Only nuclear weapons blow things up and poison through radiation,
making them far more powerful and reliable than both biological
1UK Defence White Paper, 2003, Cm6041-1 Par 3.11,
http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0312/doc08.htm.
2 ‘British Nuclear Forces, the decision that dare not speak its name’, C. Bellamy, The
World Today, May 2005.
3 UN Security Council Resolution 1540 on Weapons of Mass Destruction refers to:
‘nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery …
Means of delivery: missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of
delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, that are specially designed for
such use.’
4 Ballistic missiles follow a curved bullet-like trajectory. Cruise missiles are small
pilotless aircraft relying on their aerodynamic qualities to keep them in the air.
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weapons which rely on the deliberate use of disease and chemical
weapons which are poisons.5
Perspectives on possessing Weapons of Mass Destruction
For some people, the question of keeping Britain’s Weapons of Mass
Destruction should be answered with a clear ‘Yes’. These people
believe that we should have an Independent Nuclear Deterrent, the
ultimate guarantee of the nation’s safety against enemies known and
unknown – essential in case the nation ever finds itself alone, as it
was in 1940. They argue that Trident (and its predecessors and
succesors) meets what I call the ‘1940 requirement’ for a system that
the nation can rely on if it stands alone.
The main argument of this report is that past, present and future
system can never meet this requirement because of UK dependence
on the US.
However, even if one believes that Britain did have an Independent
Nuclear Deterrent, there are arguments for and against maintaining
it. The South African minister Abdul Minty expressed the view of the
majority of nations that::
Those who rely on nuclear weapons to demonstrate and exercise power
should recognise that such dependence on weapons of mass destruction
only serves to increase insecurity rather than promote security, peace
and development.6
The most authoritative rejection of deterrence as a delusion masking
irrationality and instability has come from General Lee Butler who
commanded all US nuclear forces and drew up the US plan for a
possible nuclear attack on Iraq in 1991.7
Sir Michael Quinlan has expressed the pro-nuclear argument as a
choice between a nuclear free world and a war free world.8 General
Butler was presented with Quinlan’s work at a meeting with the then
Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Charles Guthrie and Kevin
5 See for example, ‘What Next For Trident?’, T. Hare, Journal of the Royal United
Services Institute, April, 2005, Vol 150, No 2.
6 South African Statement to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference,
2005, http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/statements/npt03southafrica.pdf
7 http://www.cdi.org/issues/armscontrol/butler.html
8 ‘Thinking About Nuclear Weapons’, M. Quinlan, Whitehall Papers, Royal United
Services Institute, London, 1997.
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Tebbit, the then MoD Permanent Secretary. Butler handed the work
back, saying that he had taught elementary logic at the staff college
and the proposition was simply a syllogism,9 that is to say there is no
logical reason why ‘nuclear free’ and ‘war free’ should be
contradictory. For Butler, a world free of WMD was arguably both
practical to achieve and far safer than a world of nuclear armed
states. For Butler, deterrence is a slippery word used to sanctify any
manner of otherwise nonsensical ideas for the potential use of
nuclear weapons.
An example of what Butler describes is the argument made by Sir
Malcolm Rifkind, that wars can only be prevented if we declare that
we are ready to turn a conventional war into a nuclear war. ‘I remain
deeply sceptical that NATO, or the United Kingdom, should make a
declaration of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. The clear implication
of any such declaration would be that conventional aggression could
be undertaken without the fear of crossing the nuclear threshold. Put
crudely, it implies, if it is believed, that conventional war is a safe
option. For all its superficial moral attraction, therefore, a no-first-use
declaration would take us out of the realm of war prevention into the
realm of war limitation.’10 Deterrence boils down to arguing that the
more dangerous things are the safer we are. Rifkind also argues
simultaneously against small, accurate war-winning nuclear weapons
and for small nuclear weapons to send political signals to end war.
More recently, it has become fashionable to say that the
Communists were rational and could be deterred but deterrence is
no use against religious fanatics, who must be fought – if necessary,
pre-emptively.11 In fact, during the Cold War, Western and
Communist leaders portrayed each other as fanatics, Ronald
Reagan famously characterising the Soviet Union as the ‘Evil
Empire’ who had no respect for human life. Winston Churchill was
concerned that the Americans might launch preventive war against
the USSR in the 1950s.12
There is also a strong argument that possessing nuclear weapons is
illegal. The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice
9 Private information.
10 Malcom Rifkind, 16 November 1993.
11 National Security Strategy of the United States, 2002.
12 ‘The Secret State’, P. Hennessy, Allen Lane/Penguin, 2002.
The Future of Britain’s WMD4
states that nations with nuclear weapons had a legal obligation to
eliminate them through multilateral negotiation.13 This undermines
the argument that nuclear weapons are needed for Britain to keep its
seat on the UN Security Council. As a non-nuclear state, the UK
would enjoy more, not less, support from the international
community.
Many states such as South Africa point out the indirect transfer of
nuclear weapons from the US to the UK detailed in this study is a
violation of Article 1 of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which
prohibits such transfers.14
Regardless of the power-political considerations, nuclear weapons
are immoral. Peregrine Worsthorne, once editor of the Sunday
Telegraph argued in 1998:
That an individual could proudly say this - give me liberty or give me
death - is more than understandable. But we armchair Cold War warriors
in the West were saying more than this. We were saying that the whole
human race, the greater part of which was neutral in the Cold War,
should be put at risk to preserve Western liberty. How could we have
believed anything so preposterous?15
Perhaps the most common view of nuclear weapons is that simply by
having them we will never have to use them, rather like the thug who
ends up in court, arguing that he never meant to use his gun, and
only had it as a status symbol. The head of the RAF bomber
command in the 1960s put it bluntly:
13 ‘It follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in
armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law; however,
in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its
disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in
which the very survival of a State would be at stake; there exists an obligation to
pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear
disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control’, ‘Legality
of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, International Court of Justice, Advisory
Opinion, 8 July 1996, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/icj/text/index.html .
14 http://www.comeclean.org.uk/articles.php?articleID=125
15 ‘The Old Bombers who are now for Banning the Bomb’, P. Worsthorne, Spectator , 7
March 1998.
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It is no good taking refuge in the claim that the job of a deterrent is to
deter, not to fight; nothing could be more dangerous than to base a policy
on bluff, on a threat you don’t really believe you will ever have actually to
implement.16
Weapons of Mass Destruction in the world today
Today, thousands of American and Russian nuclear weapons are
ready to fire in less than 45 minutes,17 although the UK reduced the
operational readiness of its submarines following the 1998 Strategic
Defence Review.18 Robert Joseph, now President Bush’s Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control, wrote in 1998 that no action
should be taken to make an agreement with Russia to ensure
greater safety and security since:
De-alerting undermines a basic principle of deterrence; namely, the
ability to retaliate promptly so as to prevent any aggressor from
assuming it can achieve a ‘fait accompli.’ In this context, assertions that
de-alerting of U.S. strategic forces would eliminate fear of surprise attack
have not been demonstrated…. De-alerting should not be allowed to
become a back door to unilateral nuclear disarmament.19
Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of the continuation of the hair
trigger alert is the risk of Armageddon by accident, a problem made
worse since the public and political leaders alike are mostly unaware
that the nuclear threat still hangs over them (see Figure 1).
The US continues to build Trident missiles, Russia has introduced
the Topol 26 and 27, France the new M-51 and China may have new
missiles. India, Israel and Pakistan are also all adding to their
nuclear arsenals. Other states, perhaps Japan20 or Egypt,21 may
16 The Times, J. Slessor, 6 January 1963.
17 http://www.ippnw.org/RXDealert.html; http://www.ieer.org/russian/pubs/dlrtbk-e.html
18 In 1994, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin and Prime Minister Major announced that
their weapons had been ‘de-targeted’, a meaningless gesture since in war the first
action is to re-check the targets that weapons are pointed at. When a former US
launch control officer, Bruce Blair pointed this out in the Washington Post, Clinton flew
into a rage with the advisors who had convinced him that de-targeting would have real
effect.
19 ‘US Nuclear Policy in the 21st Century, Final Report’, R.G. Joseph, R.F.
Lehman, Project Directors, National Defense University/Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, Washington, D.C., 1998.
20 ‘The Beauty Queen’s Guide to World Peace’, D. Plesch, Politico’s, London, 2004,
Chapters 2 and 8.
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Figure 1: World Nuclear Weapons 200522
*Some 10,000 of
these weapons are in
storage
**The UK’s weapons
are US-sourced
***Some 5,000 of
these weapons are in
storage
choose the nuclear option. There is considerable public and official
concern over the possibility that terrorist groups may obtain WMD.
This proliferation problem is a serious matter. Indeed, as is
discussed below, both America and Britain are prepared to use their
own WMD – nuclear weapons – against such groups, possibly pre-
emptively. Nevertheless, the great difficulty of finding a terrorist
target to shoot at with nuclear weapons effectively removes this
issue as a justification for the UK’s own WMD. Prevention and
police-type actions are the principal means of tackling the problem of
terrorist access to WMD.
Arms control and disarmament has been an international priority
since the Second World War. Between 1987 and 1996, a range of
treaties came into force that regulated and removed tens of
thousands of tanks, guns, warplanes and missiles, banned nuclear
testing and chemical weapons. Now these achievements have been
forgotten. No new agreements are underway. Instead, a programme
of sanctions and possible military action is being contemplated
against the nuclear small fry – Iran and North Korea. There is an
21 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) discovered that Egypt had secretly
created a plant capable of making weapons grade radioactive material. The IAEA and
the US are both satisfied with Egypt's assurances.
22 Natural Resources Defense Council and International Institute for Strategic Studies
Number of nuclear
weapons
China 100+
France 300
India 50
Israel 200
North Korea 6?
Pakistan 50
Russia* 14,000
UK** 200
US*** 10,600
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urgent need to restart the multilateral disarmament process, and
without leadership from Washington, European states must take a
lead. I discuss how this might be done in my paper A Strategic
Concept for the Regulation and Removal of Arms and Proliferation.23
A history of American support for
Britain’s Weapons of Mass Destruction
British dependence on the US for nuclear weapons started in the
Second World War. This history shows that it is incorrect to think that
the UK was ever an independent nuclear state like France, Russia or
China.
In 1940, Churchill initiated work on a British atomic bomb, rejecting a
suggestion of cooperation from the US President, Franklin Roosevelt
in October 1941.24 He soon realised that Britain did not have the
resources to go it alone and sought to get involved with the US, but it
was not until the 1943 Quebec Agreement that Britain joined the
Manhattan project that built the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs.
Margaret Gowing, the official historian of Britain’s nuclear weapons
explains that: ‘Britain had then become only a junior partner in the
business, contributing significantly in various ways but present
largely on American sufferance’.25 In 1946, the US Congress passed
the MacMahan Act to stop nuclear collaboration with any state.
British scientists returned home with information on how to build an
atom bomb but without detailed knowledge of the industrial
production processes.
Some nuclear sharing quickly restarted, as the US needed supplies
of British controlled uranium ore from the Congo, despite the
MacMahan Act.26 Until 1952, the US intermittently provided the UK
with nine categories of information mostly on the construction of
nuclear reactors for making nuclear explosives.27 Congressional
23 http://www.psr.org/documents/psr_doc_0/program_4/scrrap.pdf
24 ‘British Thinking about Nuclear Weapons’, A.J.R. Groom, Pinter, 1974, Chapter 1
25 ‘Independence and Deterrence’, Margaret Gowing, Macmillan, 1974, Vol 1 p.3
26 ‘Nuclear Rivals: Anglo-American Atomic relations 1941-1952’, S. Paul, Ohio
University Press, 2000, passim.
27 Ibid.
The Future of Britain’s WMD8
leaders brought into the negotiations threatened to withdraw the
Marshal Aid programme to get the Attlee government to give up joint
control over the use of nuclear weapons agreed by Churchill and
Roosevelt during the war.28
In 1947, the British atomic bomb project was restarted by the Labour
government. In Peter Hennessy’s account, it was the Foreign
Secretary Ernest Bevin’s intervention that swung the discussion
amongst ministers.29 And the need to have a ‘Union Jack’ on top of
the bomb, in Bevin’s famous phrase, was driven by the humiliating
way that Bevin had just been spoken to by the US Secretary of State
James Byrnes. The programme was mentioned in Parliament in
1948, with more detail only provided shortly before the first British
atomic test in 1952 under Winston Churchill’s premiership.30
Churchill privately expressed surprise at how much money and work
had been done in secret by the Labour government.
From 1948, the US began to base nuclear capable bombers in
Britain. One of Churchill’s last political acts was to try to reach out to
the Soviet leadership after the death of Stalin in order to control the
hydrogen bomb. He found he had no influence in Washington and,
shortly before retiring, Churchill began the UK hydrogen bomb
programme, while privately expressing greater concern over the
future of the world than he had even in 1940.
Despite the great effort to produce the atomic bomb and jet bombers
to carry them, the development of hydrogen bombs and ballistic
missiles to carry them by both the US and Russia in the 1950s made
it impossible for the UK to afford an independent nuclear weapons
system.
In 1957, with great difficulty and expense, the UK exploded its first
hydrogen bomb and, shortly thereafter, the US agreed to provide full
support for the British nuclear weapons programme. As both Lorna
Arnold and Peter Hennessy describe in their studies of the British
hydrogen bomb programme, the key purpose in the mind of the
Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, was to show the Americans that
28 Groom, op. cit., p.31.
29 Hennessy, op. cit.
30 Gowing, op. cit.
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the British were important enough a nuclear power to help, rather
than to have an independent weapon.
In 1958, the US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA) was signed,
although very little was known about it in public. It has been renewed
periodically ever since, the last time in 2004. The MDA allows the US
to provide the UK with nuclear weapons designs, nuclear weapons
manufacturing and nuclear reactor technology, designs and
materials.
A secret British government assessment of ‘The Dangers of
Becoming an American Satellite’, only released after 1988, stated:
The UK, in its relatively weak position, is already greatly dependent upon
United States support. It would be surprising if the United States did not
exact a price for the support, and to some extent it does so…the more
we rely upon them, the more we shall be hurt if they withhold it.31
Nuclear explosive materials
Tons of uranium and plutonium were traded between the UK and he
US during the Cold War. This was flatly denied at the time. In 1997,
the Clinton Administration revealed the extent of this exchange
(details in the Appendix). Ross Hesketh wrote that the 5.4 tonnes of
plutonium sent to the USA amounted to ‘the entire production of
plutonium from all the UK civil nuclear power stations, up to April
1969, according to official sources’.32 This trade was helpful to the
Americans, but vital to the British nuclear weapons programme.
Today, renewed British interest in nuclear energy should be
examined closely for any commercial, political or technical
connection to nuclear weapons. How, for example, can the British
government be serious about being a nuclear weapons power if it is
not going to have a modern nuclear industry?
Nuclear warhead design and construction
The 1958 MDA created the Joint Atomic Information Exchange
Group and dozens of Joint Working Groups (JOWOGs). Documents
31 ‘Planning Paper on Interdependence’, Foreign Office, SC (58)8, Steering
Committee, 27 January 1958, PRO FO371/132330, quoted in J. Baylis, ‘Anglo-
American defence relations 1939-1984’, 2nd edition, Macmillan, London 1984.
32 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,60-1091224,00.html 29 April 2004, accessed
1 July 2005.
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obtained by the US Natural Resources Defense Council show that
the US supplied the designs of many weapons to the British. The UK
national archives on the JOWOGs, even from 1960, are still sealed.
The titles of some documents from that era show that the UK was
briefed on the use of beryllium, plutonium and uranium and the
Americans were presented with the results of British experiments
using US supplied bomb parts. US officials also benefit from the
exchanges because of the innovative and skilful approach of their
resource-starved British counterparts.
In the early 1960s, public concern over the nuclear arms race
focused on the test explosions of nuclear weapons in the
atmosphere and the accumulation of radiation in milk. After the 1963
UK/US/USSR agreement of the atmospheric test ban, the UK was
only able to carry out test explosions jointly with the US at the
underground test site in Nevada. Then, President Clinton’s support
for a test ban forced John Major’s government to follow suit and sign
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996. The last US/UK tests at
Nevada were codenamed Barnwell (1989), Houston (1990) and
Bristol (1991).
For many years, the JOWOGs were secret and were only obliquely
referred to in the open literature. Thus, two of the main British
academic studies on Anglo-American defence relations and nuclear
weapons make no more than a passing reference to them.33 It was
only through the work of the Natural Resources Defence Council in
Washington, D.C., Greenpeace UK and BASIC, that the JOWOGs
were first discussed in public. Subsequent activity by MPs such as
Frank Cook and Alan Simpson led to the British government
providing occasional lists of the JOWOGs to Parliament.34
The principal role of the JOWOGs is to assist the British in producing
nuclear warheads. Since the mid-1960s, the UK has deployed four
types of nuclear weapon, some with variants. These are the WE-177,
Polaris, Chevaline/Polaris and Trident. Only Trident is in service
today.
33 ‘The Independent Nuclear State’, J. Simpson, MacMillan, London, 1986 and ‘Anglo
American Relations since 1939’, J. Baylis, Manchester University Press, 1997.
34 Alan Simpson MP, House of Commons, Hansard, 15 December 1994, c 1222.
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The RAF and Royal Navy used the WE-177 free-fall bomb with three
versions for different military tasks. However, the British only
conducted three nuclear tests in the period when the weapon was
developed, making a British-only design most unlikely. Quite how the
warhead was designed remains a secret. However, an analysis by
the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) concludes that the
WE177 was probably based on US designs (Mark 57 and B61). A
declassified US document from 1960 obtained by the NRDC says
that the UK: ‘plans to produce several versions of the Mark 57.’35
The US supplied the design for Polaris (the W-58). In heated
exchanges in the House of Commons between the Prime Minister
Lord Home and Harold Wilson, Home confusingly said that the
Polaris warhead was probably ‘both’ the US design and a British
design of the same size.36 Further evidence that the Polaris warhead
was not a British design was that Home saw no need to test it at all,
although Harold Wilson did get US permission to conduct one.
In the early 1970s, the US stopped the key part of the JOWOG
cooperation when the Labour government said that would not have a
new nuclear weapon. There was consternation at Aldermaston at the
loss of access to US bomb-makers. US support resumed when,
under the premierships of Edward Heath and Harold Wilson, a secret
programme to put a new warhead on Polaris was begun. This
programme, known as Chevaline or ‘Super-Antelope’ in Britain, was
based on Lockheed’s US Antelope project. Technically, its function
was to defeat Soviet missile defences, but politically its function was
to keep US nuclear support.37
In 1979, Margaret Thatcher’s new Defence Secretary, Francis Pym,
announced Chevaline in Parliament. This caused much infighting in
the Labour Party, whose members had known nothing of this
programme, which was in violation of the decisions of the party
conference.38
35 ‘Safety of British Nuclear Weapon Designs’, W. Peden, British American Security
Information Council, 1991.
36 House of Commons, Hansard, 12 May 1964, c222-223
37 ‘Aldermaston and British Nuclear Weapons Development: Testing the “Zuckerman
Thesis”’, G. Spinardi, Social Studies of Science, Vol 27, 1997, pp547-582.
38 House of Commons, Hansard, 15 February 1989, c 383.
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Missiles
Forty years ago, Harold Macmillan had to deal with the fact that not
only could the government not afford independent bombs, it could
not afford independent missiles either. His government first sought a
US air-launched missile, Skybolt, and, when this was cancelled, was
offered the US Navy’s Polaris missile.
The December 1962 Nassau agreement to provide the UK with
Polaris provided the UK with missiles, submarine and reactor
technology. President Kennedy offered a similar deal to the French
President Charles de Gaulle.39 In January 1963, De Gaulle made a
speech rejecting the US offer of Polaris to France and vetoing British
membership of the Common Market on the grounds that the British
had now come under US control.
Macmillan’s Permanent Secretary, Sir Robert Scott, recorded that
the decision has ‘put us in America’s pocket for a decade.’40 The
commander of the Royal Air Force nuclear bomber force wrote
privately that the deal had been done to sustain the ‘myth’ of an
independent force.41
The two key agreements on US support made by Macmillan (the
MDA and Polaris) were made because Britain was too weak to act
independently. This underlying fact has meant that no government
has sought to change the framework of agreements established by
Macmillan, rather, they have been anxious to ensure that the US
keeps renewing them.
The Labour government of Harold Wilson came to power in 1964. Its
manifesto said that Polaris: ‘will not be independent and it will not be
British and it will not deter.’ Nevertheless, with most of the money
committed, the Wilson Cabinet, with the support of Parliament,
continued the programme, although even in retirement he said: ‘I
never believed that we had a really independent deterrent.’42
Air Vice Marshal Stuart Menaul wrote in 1980 that:
39http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/december/21/newsid_3815000/3815
251.stm
40 Cited in I. Clark, op. cit., p 413.
41
Cited in I. Clark, op. cit., p 418.
42 Hennessy, op. cit., p70 ff.
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Britain no longer has an independent nuclear deterrent…strategic
considerations as far as Britain is concerned are no longer relevant…it
could only be used after authority for the use of nuclear weapons had
been conveyed from the President of the United States to SACEUR [the
US general at NATO].43
Trident and its possible successor
Britain’s ability to continue with nuclear weapons without US support
becomes very slim to the point of invisibility.44
- Julian Lewis MP
James Callaghan, in contradiction of Labour party policy, sought a
private understanding with the US President Jimmy Carter that the
US would supply the Trident system (comprising submarines
incorporating missiles and nuclear warheads) as a successor to
Polaris. He explained how, in 1979, at a summit in Guadeloupe, he
had a chat with Carter in his beach bungalow and informally secured
the deal.45
When Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister, Trident was a
natural choice. Proud of the policy, she held a debate in parliament.
It has a launch to target time of seven to thirty minutes, ‘a range of
over 4,000 nautical miles and an accuracy, which can be measured
in metres.’46
US management and technology, including nuclear materials, is
involved throughout the Trident weapons system (see Figure 2).
According to the National Audit Office report of 1987:
The US will supply the missiles and associated strategic weapon
systems equipment, certain warhead-related components and services,
and missile preparation and refurbishment services: the remainder of the
programme will be carried out by the UK.47
43 ‘Countdown’, S. Menaul, Hale, London, 1980, p 7 and 172.
44 Remarks by Julian Lewis MP at the Royal United Services Institute, 6 July 2005.
45 This is discussed in Hennessy, op. cit.
46 Royal Navy description, http://www.royal-navy.mod.uk/static/pages/177.html.
47 ‘Ministry of Defence and Property Services Agency: Control and Management of the
Trident Programme’, National Audit Office, 1987, par 1.1.
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A former British official engaged in the acquisition of Trident recently
explained that the Royal Navy assessment in the 1980s was that the
system would remain functional for eighteen months if the US
withdrew support. Since then, US corporations have extended their
management of the programme, probably reducing this period.48
The supply of Trident commanded a political price from the
government in London. In his seminal study ‘Nuclear Weapons:
Who’s in Charge?’, Hugh Miall records comments from two British
officials on the state of US influence in the mid 1980s. ‘Sir Frank
Cooper, the Permanent Under Secretary of Defence, said, “if you ask
me whether the Americans have an undue degree of influence over
British defence policy I would have to say yes”.’
Figure 2: UK Trident dependence on the US
Trident component Nature of US dependence
Warhead design Based on the US W-76
Warhead nuclear
components
Some imported from US
Warhead nuclear factory A copy of the US TA-55 at Los Alamos built by the
US Fluor corporation
Warhead non-nuclear parts Some imported from US
Firing system Designed and built in the US
D-5 Missiles “Although specific missiles in the pool of such
missiles held at King's Bay, Georgia, will not be
identifiably British, the UK Government will take title
to the missiles it purchases."49
Missile guidance Imported from the US
Submarines British designed and built with the import of US
components and reactor technology
Aldermaston Management – 33.3% Lockheed Martin
Technology – much US sourced50
Maintenance base Management/ownership– 51% Halliburton51
48 Private conversation.
49 The Progress of the Trident Programme, Defence Committee 6th Report, 16 June
1993, HC 549.
50 See, for example, the table of Joint Working Groups and the provisions of the
Mutual Defence Agreement.
51 In-service support and refurbishment for Britain’s nuclear submarines is provided by
the Devonport Management (DML) group, 51 per cent owned by Halliburton,
www.devonport.co.uk.
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Clive Ponting, a former MoD official said:
Client state is putting it a bit strongly but there are very clear signs I think
that it’s not far short of that…They clearly do have an undue degree of
influence because when the chips are down we side with the Americans
because we think the American nuclear and intelligence material is so
important to us that we are prepared to pay that price to keep the
material flowing.52
One area where the price was paid was in support for the US Star
Wars programme which was strongly opposed by Foreign Office and
Ministry of Defence officials. Initial doubts were expressed by the
Foreign Secretary, Geoffrey Howe, only for the Prime Minister to
bring the UK into line with Washington, a pattern familiar in recent
years.
The Trident warheads
In June 1991, President George Bush Snr issued National Security
Directive 61, now partly de-classified. He ordered that the
Department of Energy ‘shall produce additional nuclear weapons
parts as necessary for transfer to the United Kingdom pursuant to
the Agreement of Cooperation’ for a period up until 1997.53
According to a UK National Audit Office statement on warhead
development and production, ‘Most of the development and
production expenditure is incurred in the US’. These costs included
the cost of testing the weapons in Nevada. ‘[Regarding] special
materials ... in 1982 Ministers decided…that a substantial proportion
[of the explosive nuclear material] should be purchased in the UK
[from British Nuclear Fuels plc]’.54 Therefore, the remaining portion of
the nuclear materials in the warheads comes from the US. Baylis
describes how, in the mid-1980s, Britain was ‘dependent for “vital
materials” for warhead production’.55 The ostensibly British warhead
was test-fired at the US underground test-site in Nevada.
52 ‘Oxford Research Group’, H. Miall, Macmillan, London, 1987, p77.
53 http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/directives.html
54 ‘Ministry of Defence and Property Services Agency: Control and Management of the
Trident Programme’, National Audit Office, 1987, appendix 4, pars 1-4; ‘Progress of
the Trident Programme’, HC 1987-1988, Defence Committee, Third Report, p 22.
55 Baylis, op. cit., p.195.
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The Aldermaston A-90 manufacturing facility, where the Trident
warheads are made, ‘appears to be a direct copy of the Plutonium
Processing Facility (TA-55) at Los Alamos’.56
The US provided Britain with details of its Trident nuclear warhead
design57 and sells Britain its cone-shaped casing.58 The US Sandia
plant ‘also designs the arming-fusing-firing mechanisms for all of the
United Kingdom's nuclear weapons’.59
Trident missile and submarine system
The British version of the US Trident system consists of four
submarines built at Barrow in Furness, each fitted with sixteen
missiles. The submarines can sail to any part of the world’s oceans.
Powered by nuclear reactors they can stay underwater, undetected,
for months at a time.
The submarines must collect the missiles from a US port in Georgia
on the Atlantic coast under a lease-purchase arrangement.60 The
extra missiles for Trident’s predecessor Polaris were British-owned
and stored at a base in Scotland, making Britain less dependent on
the US. Denis Healey heaped derision on the arrangement:
Under the rent-a-rocket agreement we have to swap these Moss Bros
missiles every seven or eight years for other missiles in the American
stockpile…[there are] some serious political disadvantages, which can be
summed up as a period of prolonged and humiliating dependence on the
United States.61
The Trident D-5 missiles are occasionally test-fired from the
submarines using a US naval facility.
Each Trident submarine carried 16 missiles. Each missile can carry
up to 14 nuclear weapons able to hit separate targets hundreds of
miles apart. However, as a result of political pressure to reduce
armaments and improved international circumstances, each missile
56 Norris, op. cit., p.72 ff
57 Annual Historical Summary [U], Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group, HQ
Defence Nuclear Agency, 1 October 1982-30 September 1983.
58 ‘Annual Summary’, Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group, 1983-1984.
59 ‘Inside Energy / with Federal Lands’, D. Kramer, May 1994, cited in W. Peden, ‘The
Next Chevaline Scandal’, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, London, 1999.
60 http://www.subasekb.navy.mil/TRIDENT%20REFIT%20FACILITY/MISSION.htm
61 ‘A Special Relationship’, J. Dumbrell, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, p 145.
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carries a much smaller load than its theoretical maximum, with a total
of no more than 48 nuclear weapons per submarine – 200 in total.
Firing Trident
This section discusses whether Britain could engage in a nuclear war
independently of Washington and how the British and American
governments prepare in peacetime for using their nuclear weapons.
The British public has been told that Trident and its successors are
intended to be the independent nuclear deterrent.
Dr. John Reid, the UK Defence Secretary, explained that, ‘the United
Kingdom's independent nuclear deterrent can be targeted and used
without the approval of any other country’.62 However, if one asks
‘Can it be used if the United States disapproves?’, we can see from
the previous analysis that this is most unlikely. Half a century ago, at
Suez, the British had to abandon a military operation under
economic pressure from Washington. In any crisis where the US and
the UK were at odds, the US would be able to prevent its use even if
the US does not have to be asked for permission.
Even in the days before Polaris, it was obvious that the US did not
regard the UK as an independent nuclear force. In 1962, Robert
McNamara, the US Defense Secretary, spoke out about the
‘dangerous’ contribution of small nuclear powers. This created
headlines in Britain and was seen as an attack on the UK nuclear
force. McNamara and his advisors sought to soothe the British press
by explaining that they were only talking about the French, since the
British ‘did not operate independently’.63
Both governments state that the UK weapons are assigned to NATO.
What does this mean in practice? According to sources familiar with
the process, the US is aware, through the NATO command structure
and the US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), of the location and
deployments of Trident submarines. US communications and
satellite facilities are normally used for keeping in touch with the
submarines and for targeting the missiles.
62 House of Commons, Hansard, 31 Oct 2005, Column 720W.
63 ‘Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain’s deterrent and America,
1957-1962’, I. Clark, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, pp 334-337.
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The command chain from the British Prime Minister to the submarine
captains does not involve the Americans. Yet the UK makes use of
US satellites to aim Trident. Former UK Trident launch control
officers have said that it would be very difficult to fire the missiles
without the use of the satellites.64 John Ainslie has provided the
details of the British reliance on US computer software, satellite
generated targeting information and related systems that would
permit the US to interfere with a British Trident launch.65
The British and American governments are at pains to point out that
they abhor the idea that nuclear weapons could ever be used
emphasising their deterrent role. But there is evidence from official
policies, the building of weapons and government behaviour in crisis
that the US and UK are prepared to use nuclear weapons in a wide
variety of circumstances, known in Britain as the ‘sub-strategic’ role
for nuclear weapons.
The Labour government strategic defence review in 1998 stated:
The credibility of deterrence also depends on retaining an option for a
limited strike that would not automatically lead to a full-scale nuclear
exchange. Unlike Polaris and Chevaline, Trident must also be capable of
performing this 'sub-strategic' role. 66
After 9/11, the British government added a ‘New Chapter’ to the
Strategic Defence Review that extended the role of nuclear weapons
further to include deterring terrorist organisations:
The UK's nuclear weapons have a continuing use as a means of
deterring major strategic military threats, and they have a continuing role
in guaranteeing the ultimate security of the UK. But we also want it to be
clear, particularly to the leaders of states of concern and terrorist
organisations, that all our forces play a part in deterrence, and that we
have a broad range of responses available. (emphasis added)
The Bush Administration’s policies on using nuclear weapons are
illuminated in its 2002 Nuclear Posture Review67 and in the
subsequent policy on combating WMD.68
64 Private information.
65http://www.comeclean.org.uk/articles.php?articleID=132
66 UK Strategic Defence Review, 1998.
67 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm.
68 http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/index.php?id=512.
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Rogers recalls a conversation in the mid 1990s with what he
described as ‘a serving British Admiral’ in which the admiral cited, as
an example of the use of sub-strategic Trident, a future confrontation
with a nuclear-armed state in the Middle East, believing it to be
eminently practicable to use a Trident missile with a single warhead
to fire a small ‘demonstration’ shot or, if necessary, use a
combination of missiles and warheads in a pre-emptive strike against
opponent’s nuclear facilities.
Less powerful warheads than the original hydrogen bombs carried by
Trident – for the ‘sub-strategic’ role – were first produced under the
government of John Major.69 This was achieved not by producing a
new nuclear weapon but by reducing the power of the warhead.70
The possibility of two explosive sizes is confirmed in ‘A New
Beginning’, AWE Annual Report 2000.71 Three sizes are mentioned
by the NRDC, as low as 300 tons and as high as 20 kilotons. Several
sources indicate that this has been achieved by removing the larger
bomb and adjusting the power of the primary.72 Paul Rogers73 and
Milan Rai74 discuss sub-strategic Trident.
Geoff Hoon, then the British Defence Minister, said:
we have always made it clear that we would reserve the right to use
nuclear weapons in conditions of extreme self-defence. Saddam can be
absolutely confident that in the right conditions we would be willing to use
nuclear weapons.75
William Arkin, long a leading expert on US nuclear weapons, wrote
about US nuclear war planning for Iraq in January 2003:
69 One of the few discussions of the purpose of this system is found in ‘Sub Strategic
Trident: A Slow-Burning Fuse’, Paul Rogers, London Defence Studies, No 34, Centre
for Defence Studies, London, 1996.
70 http://www.nrdc.org.
71 ‘A New Beginning’, AWE Annual Report, 2000, p.14.
72 Private information and ‘An End to UK Nuclear Weapons’, T. Milne, H. Beach, J.
Finney, R. Pease and J. Rotblat, A Report from the British Pugwash Group, 3 October
2002, http://www.pugwash.org/uk/documents/end-to-uk-nuclear-weapons.pdf.
73 ‘Sub Strategic Trident: A Slow-Burning Fuse’, P. Rogers, London Defence Studies,
No. 34, Centre for Defence Studies, London, 1996.
74 ‘Tactical Trident: The Rifkind Doctrine and the Third World’, M. Rai, Drava Papers,
London, 1995.
75 Frost Programme, BBC, 4 February 2003.
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At the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) in Omaha and inside
planning cells of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, target lists are being
scrutinized, options are being pondered and procedures are being tested
to give nuclear armaments a role in the new US doctrine of "pre-
emption”. According to multiple sources close to the process, the current
planning focuses on two possible roles for nuclear weapons: attacking
Iraqi facilities located so deep underground that they might be impervious
to conventional explosives and thwarting Iraq's use of Weapons of Mass
Destruction. The current nuclear planning, revealed in interviews with
military officers and described in documents reviewed by the Los
Angeles Times, is being carried out at STRATCOM's Omaha
headquarters, among small teams in Washington and at Vice-President
Dick Cheney's "undisclosed location" in Pennsylvania.76
In his memoirs, Colin Powell explained how, in 1991, Dick Cheney
ordered him, despite his objections, to prepare a plan for using
nuclear weapons on Iraq. Powell regarded the plans as disastrous
and unusable and had them burned.
Iran has been a focus of US peacetime war-planning for a decade.
Kristensen describes how: ‘Iran became the first test case for the
new doctrine, with STRATCOM performing an in-depth study in the
fall of 1995 of how to target nuclear and chemical targets in Iran with
U.S. nuclear weapons’.77
Attacks like this seem far-fetched, so it is worth concluding the
discussion of Firing Trident by illustrating that it is routine in
peacetime to plan for using nuclear weapons. The US Joint Chiefs of
Staff Joint Doctrine for Theater Nuclear Operations regarding nuclear
war planning in peacetime:
76 ‘The Nuclear Option in Iraq: The US has lowered the bar for using the ultimate
weapon’, W. Arkin, Los Angeles Times, 26 January 2003.
77 ‘Targets of Opportunity: How nuclear planners found new targets for old weapons’,
H. Kristensen, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 53, No. 5, September/October
1997: Kristensen draws on the U.S. Strategic Command that was partially declassified
and released under the Freedom of Information Act, ‘Minutes of the Fifty-Fourth
United States Strategic Command Strategic Advisory Group Meeting (U), 19-20
October 1995, Offutt AFB, Nebraska’, Secret/rd, January 1996, pp. 4, 11.
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US Procedures for planning nuclear war in peacetime
Proper joint operation planning increases the commander’s flexibility
and facilitates the package approval and release process.
Peacetime Planning
Given an operation plan within an area of responsibility and/or joint
operations area and a threat, it is advantageous to plan as many
potential operations as possible in peacetime. 78
Present US support for UK WMD
The US supports the UK in keeping its weapons ready to explode
and helping to develop new weapons. This technological and
scientific support is currently organised through a number of Joint
Working Groups (see Figure 3).
In order to prepare for a UK decision on a successor to Trident, the
UK government has already spent around £300 million refitting the
factory at Aldermaston, an investment equal to some 60% of the
current book value of the factory, estimated by the government at
about £500 million.79 The refit includes a new high-powered laser
and a supercomputer. The history of collaboration on nuclear
weapons between the US and the UK suggests that much of this
expenditure will have invested in US technology. In addition,
Lockheed Martin part-manage the factory. The activist group the
Nuclear Information Service tracks the ongoing construction of new
facilities and the recruitment of staff to make the next generation of
nuclear weapons.80
78 JP-3-12-1, available at www.globalsecurity.org.
79 House of Commons, Hansard, 11 Jan 2005.
80 http://www.nuclearinfo.org.
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Figure 3: US/UK Joint Working Groups81
Joint Working
Group
Title
6 Radiation Simulation and Kinetic Effects
9 Energetic Materials
22 Nuclear Materials
23 Warhead Electrical Components and Technologies
28 Non-Nuclear Materials
29 Nuclear Counter-Terrorism Technology
30 Facilities
31 Nuclear Weapons Engineering
32 Nuclear Warhead Physics
34 Computational Technology
36 Aircraft, Missile and Space System Hardening
37 Laboratory Plasma Physics
39 Manufacturing Practices
41 Nuclear Warhead Accident Response
42 Nuclear Weapon Code Development
43 Nuclear Weapon Environment and Damage Effects
Methodologies for Nuclear Weapon Safety
Assurance
The debate so far on a successor to Trident
Mike Gapes: You do not know what the options are?
Mr Hoon: Yes, I do.
Mike Gapes: You do know what the options are. At this point is there
anything you would like to say about what those options are?
Mr Hoon: No.82
Since the 2005 election, some debate has begun in the House of
Commons about the various options. There are four US-sourced
options for a successor to Trident being discussed inside and outside
81 House of Commons, Hansard, 22 Feb 2005, column 601.
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government. These are: to keep Trident going by building new
submarines for the existing missiles; to adapt Cruise missile-carrying
submarines; to provide the RAF with an air-launched missile; and
lastly, to wait and join the currently secret American programme for a
replacement for Trident.
There is no solely British option. Hoon and his officials ruled out a
European option as a successor to Trident because it is prohibited
by the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.83
The Trident replacement decision is likely to follow US decisions, as
happened in the 1970s at the time of replacing Polaris. Then, the UK
at first envisaged simply keeping Polaris going, which seemed an
easy and acceptable option for parliament and the public to accept.
Later, when it appeared that the US was scrapping US Polaris and
building a new system, it was more difficult to argue against
replacing British Polaris.
Inter-service rivalry is also a feature of the current debate, as
happened at the time of the decision to replace Polaris. Then and
now, the Army sees the expenditure as a diversion from the need for
‘boots on the ground’ soldiering. The Air Force (which had a nuclear
force in the Polaris era) argues it can do the job better than the Navy
(now favouring a nuclear missile for the new Typhoon/Eurofighter84)
and the rest of the Navy suggests that something cheaper than big
new submarines would be sufficient.
The US decision on a Trident successor will have a major influence
on the UK decision, because the British need American technology,
and need to ensure that they do not acquire technology that the
Americans are phasing out. Early indications are that the US will
choose a ballistic missile submarine that is a conventional/nuclear
hybrid. The precedent is Trident itself. The UK was forced to acquire
the more expensive Trident D5 when the US decided to phase out
the earlier Trident C4 around 2000, meaning it would no longer offer
the UK participation in the Trident C4 programme. The decision
about phasing out Trident C4 was made in 1981, twenty years in
83 The Americans have made a condition of their support since the late 1940s that the
UK not even share information with France, despite the French role in the British and
US programmes of the early 1940s.
84 ‘Trident: the done deal’, R. Fox, New Statesman, 13 June 2005
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advance of the actual replacement and ten years after the discussion
on a Polaris replacement began. The technical choices are
discussed in more detail below.
In their recent articles, the former MoD nuclear planning director, Tim
Hare, and Michael Clarke of King’s College, London, note the UK’s
dependence on the US for the technology, but neither draw any
policy conclusions from it. Their assessments of the geopolitical
universe of British policy do not account for the gravitational pull from
Washington. In contrast, Admiral Raymond Lygo has observed that,
‘we should not think of it [Trident and its replacement] as
independent’ and that the nuclear relationship will continue ‘to tie the
UK to US policy’.85
Michael Clarke argues against a decision to replace UK Trident with
a another system of the same capability. There is, he argues:
 no current or near-term threat from another nation;
 any chemical or biological attack on the UK from the Middle
East would not be responded to with nuclear weapons
because of the political hostility this would create;
 sub-strategic Trident – and perhaps any sub-strategic
weapon – is not usable in the Third World;
 there is no plausible emerging nuclear competitor to the US
even by 2050, unless, he is careful to point out, the US
creates such a threat through overly aggressive pursuit of
the war on terror.
These are convincing arguments, but presume a UK independence
that does not exist.
There are those who believe that Britain should get rid of its nuclear
capability altogether. Michael Portillo makes similar arguments to
Michael Clarke, but concludes that the UK should depend totally on
the United States.86 There is still also the traditional antinuclear
argument from within the Labour and Liberal parties.
85 Admiral Raymond Lygo, remarks at the Royal United Services Institute, July 2005.
86 ‘Does Britain Need Nuclear Missiles? No. Scrap them’, Michael Portillo, Sunday
Times, 19 June 2005.
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In the end, the UK government is likely to opt for the best US
technology it can afford – a point made in Hennessy’s review of the
topic. As Clarke observes about the present Trident system, ‘it is
credible because it is the most sophisticated currently available.’87
President Bush’s support for UK WMD
A key objective for the Blair government during 2003 was to ensure
the renewal in 2004 of the Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA) with
minor amendment that permits the US to share nuclear weapons
technology with Britain. The present Bush Administration prides itself
on its tough pursuit of US interests. One can logically deduce that
the Bush Administration would not have renewed the MDA without
being certain that the UK will continue to provide reliable support.
In a formal letter to his officials endorsing the renewal, President
Bush said that the UK is:
making substantial and material contributions to the mutual defense and
security. The proposed Amendment will permit cooperation that will
further improve our mutual defence posture and support our interests
under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.88
He explained to Congress that that agreement will continue to:
permit the transfer of nonnuclear parts, source, byproduct, special
nuclear materials, and other material and technology for nuclear
weapons and military reactors. … In the light of our previous close
cooperation and the fact that the United Kingdom has committed its
nuclear forces to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, I have
concluded that it is in our interest to continue to assist them in
maintaining a credible nuclear force.
For George Bush, his decision appears to makes Britain’s nuclear
force credible. Would he do so free of charge? US support does not,
in fact, make the idea of British independence more credible - quite
the opposite.
Had the UK not gone to war with the US in Iraq, neither President
Bush nor the Congress are likely to have agreed that cooperation
87 ‘Does My Bomb Look Big In This? Britain’s nuclear choices after Trident’, M. Clarke,
International Affairs, January 2004.
88 June 14 2004
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was close, especially in the climate of ‘you are either with us or
against us’ that has prevailed since 9/11.
However, it is reasonable to assume that nuclear weapons
technology is supplied with a quid pro quo, although this is not
publicly acknowledged.
The ease with which Britain acquires American nuclear weapons
technology is not matched by special treatment when it comes to the
supply of conventional armaments. The Blair government failed to
persuade the US Congress and the Bush Administration to exempt
the UK from the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
which restricts American export of conventional weapons.
Future nuclear systems
There are several options for the warhead that may succeed Trident.
It is not commonly known that Britain quietly developed a new
nuclear weapon at the end of the Cold War. With the usual US
assistance, the UK apparently carried out three tests of a Tactical Air
To Surface Missile Warhead in 1989, 1990 and 1991. In 1993, the
Conservative government told Parliament that a new tactical
warhead was well underway although a year later the weapon was
cancelled. The UK may have a new US-tested nuclear warhead on
the shelf ready to be manufactured, provided the US is prepared to
supply parts and management.
The US has already begun funding the design work on a new
generation of nuclear weapons. The Bush Administration’s policy on
the future of US nuclear forces, including the Trident system, was
made by the Pentagon in January 2002 in the Nuclear Posture
Review.89 It recommended that ‘new capabilities must be developed
89 ‘Today's nuclear arsenal continues to reflect its Cold War origin, characterized by
moderate delivery accuracy, limited earth penetrator capability, high-yield warheads,
silo and sea-based ballistic missiles with multiple independent reentry vehicles, and
limited retargeting capability.’
‘New capabilities must be developed to defeat emerging threats such as hard and
deeply buried targets (HDBT), to find and attack mobile and relocatable targets, to
defeat chemical or biological agents, and to improve accuracy and limit collateral
damage. Development of these capabilities, to include extensive research and timely
fielding of new systems to address these challenges, are imperative to make the New
Triad a reality.’ Nuclear Posture Review, US Department of Defense January 2002
www.globalsecurity.org.
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to defeat emerging threats such as hard and deeply buried targets
(HDBT), to find and attack mobile and relocatable targets, to defeat
chemical or biological agents, and to improve accuracy and limit
collateral damage’.
The New York Times reported that ‘worried that the nation's aging
nuclear arsenal is increasingly fragile, American scientists have
begun designing a new generation of nuclear arms meant to be
sturdier and more reliable and to have longer lives, federal officials
and private experts say’.90 These weapons are included in the
Reliable Replacement Warhead programme which has widespread
support in the US Congress. It is probable that the UK will participate
in this programme.
There is significant political and institutional pressure in the US to
restart explosive nuclear testing at the underground test-site in
Nevada, despite the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The US Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control, Robert Joseph, judged in a 1998
study that ‘retaining the safety, reliability, and performance of the
nuclear weapons stockpile in the absence of underground nuclear
testing is the highest-risk component of the US strategy for
sustaining deterrence’.91 Any British decision to continue with US
sources of weapons will require acceptance of US resumption of
testing. The US is unlikely to resume testing for several years to
come, if at all, but should it do so, the UK would not be in a position
to oppose it.
New submarines take some fifteen years to build and as the oldest
UK Trident submarine, Vanguard, will end its planned service life in
2023, a replacement will have to be started in 2008. The US Nuclear
Posture Review explained that ‘the Navy has extended the Trident
hull life to 44 years. This in turn will require the DoD [the Pentagon]
to extend the service life of the D-5 [missile]’. A similar decision in
the UK would mean that the oldest submarine, Vanguard, would
cease to operate in 2038 rather than 2023 as planned at present.
90 ‘US redesigning atomic weapons’, W.J. Broad, New York Times, 7 February 2005.
91 Joseph and Lehman op.cit.
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US plans for new missiles and submarines
A British decision to continue with its existing trend of obtaining the
most advanced US system would mean buying into a new submarine
and missile that would be available for use about twenty years from
now and which would continue in service for a further thirty or forty
years up to 2060.
According to the Nuclear Posture Review, the Pentagon will build a
replacement for Trident system to be ready around 2029 - in time for
the UK to share the technology:
The Navy is currently studying two options for future follow-on SSBNs
[nuclear submarines]:
a variant of Virginia-class nuclear attack submarines (SSN);
a dedicated SSBN (either a new design or a derivative of the Trident
SSBN) ... If the decision is made to develop a new dedicated SSBN, a
program would have to be initiated around 2016 to ensure that a new
platform is available in 2029.92
There has been some discussion in both the UK and the US of
producing a new multi-purpose submarine capable of using both
conventional and nuclear-armed missiles as a successor to Trident,
in the UK’s case, a version of the Astute submarines. This would fit
the description of the US first option discussed in the Nuclear
Posture Review. A detailed study by the Massachusetts Institute for
Technology on the Future of the Trident Force provides an indication
of some of the extra weapons that might be fitted alongside or
instead of a Trident-style missile.93 These could include 500km
ballistic missiles, 2000+km Cruise Missiles, armed robot-planes,94
mini-submarines and special forces.
In addition, the US may be pursuing a classified programme to meet
the requirement of the second option in the Nuclear Posture Review
and this will not see the light of day for some years yet. Only long
range ballistic missiles give the capability to destroy any target on
earth in five to thirty minutes from the order to fire. This capability is
92 http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/policy/dod/npr.htm
93 http://web.mit.edu/ssp/Publications/pubs.html
94 The US ground-based units already use the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
armed with Hellfire Missiles.
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consider vital in US policy and the second option is designed to
provide it.
Conclusions and recommendations
The UK does not, and never has had fully independent nuclear
capability. The UK does have a nuclear weapons programme, but it
is and always has been dependent on US technology and supplies.
Even between 1946 and 1958, US information acquired during the
war was the basis of the programme and the US provided secret
support. The UK cannot afford to go it alone.
In general, the British public believes that the UK is protected by an
independent nuclear deterrent. No government wishes to admit to
the weakness that dependence implies.
In return for US support for the UK nuclear weapons programme, the
UK is compelled to support, broadly, US international policy. Where
there is agreement there is no problem.
Today though, with widespread concern over the long term direction
of US policy it is essential that the public understand the underlying
connection between the special nuclear relationship and the special
political relationship.
On present trends the UK will continue to reject initiatives for
multilateral disarmament and adhere to a policy based on the
threatened use of nuclear weapons in ever more unlikely
circumstances.
It also means that the UK, if it continues to have nuclear weapons, it
is likely to be committed to acquiring whatever the US chooses to
replace its own Trident missiles from 2029. What the US will choose
is not yet known. This course of action will not supply Britain with a
weapon it could use if it ever stood alone as in 1940.
The unfortunate reality for the British people is that, unknown to
them, they have a nuclear weapon that is not independent and is
committed to support unrealistic US-led policy for the military use of
nuclear weapons. It is not realistic to support a replacement for
Trident and also complain that Britain is too closely associated with
America. The UK should cease to try to keep up appearances and
adopt a policy based on the reality that it is not an independent
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nuclear power. Trident should not be replaced and should be phased
out now.
The government should also address a number of technical
questions on Britain’s WMD and associated technologies:
1. How can the WMD operated by Britain be used should the
United States withdraw its support or act preventively?
2. Were any reassurances required by the Bush Administration
before it renewed the US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement in
2004 concerning the direction of British defence and civil
nuclear policy?
3. How near to production is the US-assisted nuclear weapon
the Conservative government tested and developed after
Trident and cancelled in October 1993?
4. How much of the spending at Aldermaston is on equipment
and services from US companies?
With greater freedom of action to work with the US, the EU and other
partners, the UK should renew the multilateral disarmament agenda
which achieved so much in the 1980s and 1990s. Supporters of
nuclear weapons used to argue for a ‘Twin Track’ of arms and arms
control, of multilateral as opposed to unilateral disarmament. Now,
there is no international programme of arms control and
disarmament. It is unrealistic to consider that the world can continue
indefinitely with uncontrolled nuclear armaments and not see a
nuclear war. The UK should join the many other countries, notably
South Africa, who are working to reduce and remove nuclear and
other armaments.
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Appendix
US-UK trade in nuclear explosive materials
DECLASSIFICATION OF THE QUANTITY OF PLUTONIUM
ACQUIRED FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM UNDER BARTERS A,
B, AND C OF THE 1958 UNITED STATES/UNITED KINGDOM
MUTUAL DEFENSE AGREEMENT, 22 December 1997
The Department of Energy committed to provide any additional
information that could be released regarding plutonium inventories.
DOE, with the cooperation of the United Kingdom (UK) Government,
is releasing additional information regarding nuclear materials
barters, i.e., the quantity of plutonium received from the UK and the
tritium and highly enriched uranium provided to the UK under each of
the individual Barters (A, B, and C). In addition, the Department is
releasing information regarding the quality of the plutonium in terms
of Pu-240 content. The release of this information will provide the
public with more information regarding plutonium inventories.
SPECIFICALLY:
Barter A
1960 - 1969
Barter B
1964 - 1969
Barter C
1975 - 1979
Total
Plutonium
Received from
the UK
0.5 metric
tons
4.1 metric
tons
0.8 metric
tons
5.4 metric
tons
Tritium Delivered
to the UK
6.0
kilograms None
0.7
kilograms
6.7
kilograms
HEU Delivered
to the UK None
7.5 metric
tons None
7.5 metric
tons
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The Pu-240 content of the 5.4 metric tons received under the barters
was as follows:
Pu - 240 content Metric Tons Received
2% 0.1
10 - 12% 1.2
13 - 15% 1.9
16 - 20% 2.2
Total 5.4
BACKGROUND:
The total quantity of plutonium received by barter was announced in
February 1996; today we are releasing the quantities received for
each of the individual barters. Programs for mutual defense and
international cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy are
authorized by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. The
1958 United States/ United Kingdom Mutual Defense Agreement had
barter provisions for the exchange and safeguarding of atomic
material.
Most plutonium was shipped from the UK to the Hanford and
Savannah River Sites. Prior to 1964, some plutonium received under
Barter A was used for military purposes. In 1964, the U.S. and the
UK agreed to use Barter A and Barter B plutonium for civilian
programs and that an equivalent amount of U.S. plutonium could be
substituted for UK plutonium in U.S. civilian programs. Civilian
programs include californium production and reactor research. The
Barter C was not so restricted. Some of the plutonium received
under Barter C was used in U.S. nuclear weapons.
Information released is based on evaluating available records; it may
be updated or revised based on re-evaluation of the methodology
used originally or upon the availability of any newly discovered
information.
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By declassification, the United States government with the
cooperation of the U.K. government is acting as a global leader in
nuclear information transparency.
Hydrogen bomb outline
Also from the Foreign Policy Centre:
BRITAIN’S ENERGY FUTURE: SECURING THE ‘HOME FRONT’
Stephen Twigg, Dan Plesch, Greg Austin and Fiona Grant
September 2005
£4.95
Environmental security, including the role that renewables can play,
has become one of the highest priorities on the international agenda.
Yet the British Government has set a target for its own use of
renewables that is among the lowest in Europe, and even then the
UK is not on track to meet it. Britain cannot lead internationally on
these issues without a dramatic change in its domestic policy
settings and a more visible link between its international goals and
domestic achievements. Overlaying the long-standing environmental
agenda, Britain and the world face new risks with oil infrastructure
and security in the Persian Gulf. These circumstances provide both
the need and a foundation for a new political consensus, both
domestic and international, for a ‘powershift’ to renewable energy
sources. Such a rapid shift away from dependence on hydrocarbons
to low carbon fuels will benefit the economy, tighten international
security, strengthen development policy and, last but not least, help
mitigate climate change. Traditionally these issues have been the
province of environmentalists and to a lesser extent the international
development sector, but now there is a new national security
imperative for a rapid transition to renewable energy.
Individual publications can be ordered from
Central Books, 99 Wallis Road, London, E9 5LN
Tel: +44 (0) 845 458 9910 Fax: +44 (0) 845 458 9912
Email: mo@centralbooks.com
(post and package charge applies)
To read online go to www.fpc.org.uk/publications
About the Foreign Policy Centre
The Foreign Policy Centre (FPC) is a marketplace of ideas for the
global good. It was launched under the patronage of the British
Prime Minister Tony Blair to develop a vision of a fair and rule-based
world order. We develop and disseminate innovative policy ideas
which promote:
 Effective multilateral solutions to global problems
 Democratic and well-governed states as the foundation
of order and development
 Partnerships with the private sector to deliver public
goods
 Support for progressive policy through effective public
diplomacy
 Inclusive definitions of citizenship to underpin
internationalist policies.
The Foreign Policy Centre publishes pamphlets, policy briefs and
essay collections by key thinkers from around the world. Land-mark
publications have included Pre-empting Nuclear Terrorism by Amitai
Etzioni, Energy Empire (Russia) by Fiona Hill, Free and Fair (trade)
edited by Phoebe Griffith and Jack Thurston, The Beijing Consensus
by Joshua Cooper Ramo, The Post-Modern State and World Order
by Robert Cooper, Network Europe and Public Diplomacy by Mark
Leonard, NGOs Rights and Responsibilities by Michael Edwards,
and Third Generation Corporate Citizenship by Simon Zadek.
The Centre runs a rich and varied events programme which allows
people from business, government, NGOs, think-tanks, lobby groups
and academia to interact with speakers who include Prime Ministers,
Presidents, Nobel Prize laureates, global corporate leaders, activists,
media executives and cultural entrepreneurs from around the world.
For more information, please visit www.fpc.org.uk.
